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Any country thinking of easing COVID-19 lock-
downs must be confident that they have a robust
system in place to find, test, trace, isolate and support
new cases. This is essential if they are to minimise the
risks of a second wave going out of control. The
theory is simple. Anyone with symptoms is tested
and, if positive, their contacts are traced and advised
or instructed to isolate. The reality is somewhat dif-
ferent. It requires a complex system with many inter-
linking components, demanding rapid and effective
communication between different organisations,
some of which are newly created, while others may
be combining their day-to-day work with a major
expansion in capacity. Even the best resourced
public health system would struggle given the scale
of the pandemic. For many, especially those whose
capacity has been diminished as a consequence of
sustained underinvestment, the challenges are enor-
mous. To help those who are facing these challenges,
we have examined what countries across Europe are
doing, seeking where possible lessons that can be
learned from their experiences.
This analysis uses information gathered from
the COVID Health System Response Monitor,
created by the European Observatory on Health
Systems and Policies,1 the World Health
Organisation European Regional Office and the
European Commission. A network of national
correspondents from 50 countries has prepared a
series of structured reports on national responses to
the pandemic, regularly updating them as events
develop.
Conceptually, we can consider a find, test, trace,
isolate and support programme as a complex adap-
tive system, with the individual being tested passing
along a non-linear route involving multiple paths,
each with feedback loops and with their speed and
direction influenced by a multiplicity of factors, many
outside their control. Practically, however, if we are
to help the busy policymaker, we must simplify this
considerably, something that we have done by por-
traying the main elements of the system as a Snakes
and Ladders boardgame (Figure 1). Snakes and
Ladders is remarkably well suited to this exercise.
To be successful (i.e. to win the game) countries
must ensure that those with COVID-19 progress as
quickly as possible from the start to the finish. If this
does not happen, new cases will appear, and another
lockdown will be needed. They can do this most
effectively by putting in place measures that enhance
their ability to find, test, trace, isolate and support
(i.e. landing on ladders) and by avoiding setbacks
that occur due to insufficient capacity in the health
system and beyond (i.e. avoiding snakes). We now
run through the boardgame, pointing out many of
the steps that policymakers should be mindful of,
highlighting approaches that countries are currently
taking to implement a find, test, trace, isolate and
support system and thereby ‘win the game’. Before
doing so, however, it is important to note an import-
ant difference from the real game, in which players
land on squares at the throw of a dice. In this case,
countries that went into the pandemic with strong
public health systems and systems of governance
are more likely to land on ladders because the cap-
acity is already in place. The role of the public is also
central and unless people are made aware of the
symptoms of COVID-19 and the importance of get-
ting tested, it will be difficult to ‘find’ cases in the first
place.
Producing and procuring enough testing
materials
The game starts with procurement, with a focus on
molecular testing supplies for nose and throat reverse
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transcription polymerase chain reaction swabs, the
gold standard test recommended2 by the World
Health Organization to identify COVID-19 cases.
Testing requires reliable supplies of a range of mater-
ials, including swabs, transport media, reagents, pri-
mers, assays and polymerase chain reaction
machines. Many of these are also used to test for
other infections but, during a pandemic, countries
face supply constraints, a ‘snake’ that inhibits find,
test, trace, isolate and support before it has a chance
to get started.
Equipped with the genetic sequence from China,
Germany and the UK managed to manufacture some
of the earliest COVID-19 tests outside Asia and
Germany quickly purchased millions of them.
Germany also published a blueprint that the World
Health Organization could share with other countries
to support their use of the newly developed test.
However, large-scale testing is only possible if labora-
tories have all of the items required, from glassware
to polymerase chain reaction machines. This requires
very well-functioning procurement and distribution
Figure 1. The Snakes and Ladders boardgame of find, test, trace, isolate and support.
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systems, something that many countries have
struggled to achieve, and even Germany, widely
praised for its ability to scale up testing capacity rap-
idly, has experienced periods when demand has
exceeded supply. Countries that do not manufacture
these items themselves have struggled to obtain them
in a global market where they are competing against
others with greater purchasing power. Some, such as
Norway, have developed and manufactured their
own tests3 to minimise dependence on those produced
elsewhere. Rather like printers, where cartridges are
specific to particular brands, polymerase chain reac-
tion machines are often licensed for use with specific
reagents, with global stocks of many of them rapidly
depleted. In response, some countries, including
Belgium, the UK and Canada eased regulations to
enable more flexible use of reagents, drawing on
South Korea’s earlier response to Middle East
respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV).
Once procured and warehoused, supplies need to
be distributed to testing sites and laboratories.
Failure to do so effectively creates a snake because
testing sites cannot administer tests without the right
supplies. Countries offering home testing faced logis-
tic challenges, especially as postal services were often
weakened because of staff shortages and working
with social distancing. Some countries also faced par-
ticular challenges in getting tests to certain high risk
settings, such as care homes, as in the UK.4 A failure
to distribute test kits to where they are most needed
will enable new cases to remain undetected, allowing
transmission to continue.
Developing sufficient skills and facilities to
meet testing needs
While few countries were conducting tests outside of
hospitals early in the pandemic, most now do so, for
example by building drive-through or mobile testing
units, while some, such as Austria, the UK and
Estonia, have also started home testing. Some gov-
ernments have outsourced some components of this
work to private companies, for example in Finland,
Estonia and the UK, although with varying degrees
of success.
Although these measures can increase the volume
of testing and minimise the risk of cross-contamina-
tion in hospitals, they also present enormous logis-
tical challenges as testing supplies must be distributed
to a large number of testing sites, while testing on a
large scale depends on recruitment of staff who are
unlikely to have experience in taking samples. Taking
a nasopharyngeal swab does require some degree of
training about how and (critically) when to test to
reduce the risk of false-negative results. Without
proper training, tests will be wasted and need to be
repeated, which in turn erodes limited capacity
(another snake).
After taking a swab, samples should reach the
laboratory rapidly. Otherwise they may have to be dis-
carded and repeated. Thus, it is important to ensure
that there is a well-coordinated system to ensure trans-
port of samples from test sites to laboratories. Ideally,
testing sites and laboratories would be co-located, as in
hospitals and in some South Korean drive-through test-
ing sites. This is a ladder, although one that is rare in
community testing sites in Europe. The ultimate goal is
to develop a test that does not require a laboratory,
using a point of care test that can produce immediate
results, but those that have been developed so far have
not performed sufficiently well to depend on. Estonia
offers an innovative approach, using drones to deliver
samples directly to laboratories. In the UK, approxi-
mately half of all testing takes place in just three com-
mercial mega-laboratories, creating transport
bottlenecks and reports of discarded samples.
Strengthening laboratory capacity to
rapidly analyse samples and immediately
report the results
The ability to scale up testing will be easier in coun-
tries that have had sustained investment in health
infrastructure, including laboratory equipment, tech-
nicians, logistics systems and information technology.
Germany5 entered the pandemic with a strong diag-
nostics and chemicals industry, which allowed it to
implement large scale testing rapidly.6 In contrast, the
UK did not. Thus, a lack of sufficient laboratory cap-
acity is another snake that will create severe delays in
processing tests, possibly requiring substantial re-test-
ing which exacerbates an already difficult situation.
Where laboratory capacity is insufficient, three
types of response can be seen. One involves expand-
ing existing medical laboratories or repurposing
others, such as those involved in veterinary surveil-
lance in universities, as in Croatia, Cyprus, France,
Estonia, Germany, Lithuania and Norway, among
others. Thus, Germany5 rapidly commissioned test-
ing in 300 local laboratories and Sweden also used
existing laboratories in all but two of its 21 regions.
A second involves creation of a few centralised mega-
laboratories. In contrast, in the UK, outsourcing
companies, many with little or no experience of run-
ning laboratories, were contracted to construct a few
mega-laboratories, creating a highly centralised
system. A third approach, seen in Ireland and
Finland, involved samples being sent abroad for test-
ing, although several thousand sent from the UK to
the USA subsequently had to be repeated. Other
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measures that also contribute include accelerated
training of laboratory technicians, as in Israel, or
use of robots, as in Sweden.
While there is widespread agreement that tests
should be conducted within a country, where pos-
sible, debate continues as to the other approaches.
Countries adopting the first one do appear to have
been successful in administering and reporting large
numbers of tests, whereas the situation in the UK is
much less clear, with the chair of the National
Statistics Authority describing the resulting statistics
as essentially meaningless.
Once samples are processed, automated reporting
can create a ladder, helping to deliver results quickly
to cases and contact tracers who will be able to initi-
ate tracing sooner. There are numerous examples of
countries where this is working, including Belgium,
Estonia, Iceland, Turkey and particularly Lithuania,
where results are currently being delivered within 6–
8 h. Rapid initiation of contact tracing will reduce the
risk of further transmission. It also increases the like-
lihood that suspected cases will agree to isolate while
they wait for their results. Without an automated
system, results have to be telephoned individually to
cases, which is resource intensive and can delay noti-
fication and isolation.
Self-evidently, there must be a system to monitor
test performance to ensure false positives and nega-
tives are minimised. This may create logistic chal-
lenges where new or repurposed laboratories have
come on stream, although there are examples, such
as those in Italy and Ireland, that can offer lessons.
Building a large, well-trained workforce to
conduct contact tracing (even in countries
using digital technologies)
Despite renewed attention, contact tracing is a core
component of public health departments, which have
long experience in preventing transmission of other
communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, hepatitis
and sexually transmitted infections. Contact tracing
requires a well-resourced existing public health infra-
structure, with a trained workforce that is well con-
nected with local services. Such a system will enable
clusters and complex outbreaks to be detected early.
This is an important ladder that will help to
strengthen the find, test, trace, isolate and support
process and is crucial for any containment or mitiga-
tion strategy. Various strategies have been used to
trace contacts, outlined elsewhere7 but each case
must be interviewed to ensure that they isolate, iden-
tify and risk assess their contacts, providing sufficient
information to locate and engage with them. An inad-
equate number of contact tracers creates a snake as
manual contact tracing is time consuming, demand-
ing a large workforce. Any delays will lead to
increased transmission.
To avoid this snake, several countries have
recruited paid contact tracers to work in call centres,
including France (>5000), the UK (18,000) and
Germany (up to five contact tracers per 20,000 inhab-
itants), although a recent survey in Germany showed
that only 24% of departments were able to meet this
target in mid-May and it is unclear what proportion
will be experienced contact tracers. There are various
ways to boost the contact tracing workforce. They
include inviting experienced environmental health
officers, sexual health specialists and retired doctors
and nurses, as the UK has done (although uptake is
unknown). Others have recruited military personnel
(as in Germany and the UK) and medical students (as
in Finland), or recruited volunteers (as in Cyprus).
However, in all cases, there can be challenges in
ensuring that they are all adequately trained.
There has been considerable attention on digital tech-
nology, specifically apps as a potential ladder, given
their potential to identify and notify contacts quickly.
Countries where they have been implemented include
Austria, Bulgaria, Canada (Alberta), Finland, Georgia,
Iceland and Italy, while Germany has announced their
app will be launched in mid-June. The UK, which
adopted its own centralised system, unlike most other
countries that used existing capabilities of mobile
phones, has undertaken a pilot but the results are
unknown. However, while apps may deliver speed,
coverage and compliance are not guaranteed, meaning
that considerable time is still required to manually trace
all contacts. Recognising that digital solutions do not
offer a panacea, Belgium and France have opted for
manual contact tracing initially and Malta continues
to debate its use, along with Finland, which is piloting
robotic callers. To support the required increase in cap-
acity, the German Ministry of Health has committed
E50 million to support necessary upgrades in hardware
and software. In many countries (including Austria,
Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, France, Greece and
Ukraine) primary care services are integrated into the
test, trace, isolate process and can monitor and support
cases more effectively.
Supporting people in isolation (unless you
want to start the game again)
Isolation is arguably the most important part of the
‘test, trace, isolate’ process according to recent
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evidence in pre-print.8 A team of community volun-
teer contact tracers in the UK published data9 from a
pilot in which it took approximately 80min to
manage each case, with many contacts were unwilling
to isolate. Measures to support isolation are therefore
an important ladder and in Denmark and Finland,
people who cannot isolate will be accommodated
elsewhere (albeit for a fee in Finland). The same
approach has also been used successfully to prevent
outbreaks in care homes in South Korea.
Without facilities to support vulnerable individuals
to isolate, and especially to minimise any loss of
income, it is likely that transmission will rise, another
snake that could set back the entire process.
Enforcing isolation is also critical7 and many coun-
tries impose fines. Some countries, including
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway and
Ukraine7 use geolocation data to monitor the move-
ments of cases, but such efforts still require a dedi-
cated workforce to enforce it. This requires resources
and connections to local service providers who know
the local populations. Some groups10 have suggested
that community health workers could be trained for
this purpose.
Successful ‘test, trace, isolate’ depends on
having adequate capacity in many areas of
the public health system
The resources required to successfully find, test, trace,
isolate and support cannot be underestimated. Each
step requires complex management and logistics and
a well-resourced public health infrastructure and
workforce. Setbacks can be encountered at any
stage, but many can be anticipated. Many countries
have developed innovative measures that can boost
capacity rapidly. However, it is important to focus on
the outcome of find, test, trace, isolate and support
rather than the amount of activity. Increasing the
number of tests, especially if the numbers reported
do not include those actually reported on, as in the
UK, will have limited value without a well-resourced
system to trace and isolate cases. In addition to scale,
speed is essential. Delays at any stage will allow more
cases to remain under the radar, silently spreading the
infection to others. Ultimately, the success of find,
test, trace, isolate and support is to get countries
out of lockdown. This will depend critically on their
ability to be coordinated, flexible and prepared.
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